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THIS article is directed primarily to the need and-merits of Federal
licensing and the constitutionality of Federal licensing of airports.
The idea of licensing of airports by the Federal Government is not
new. The problem was pointed up, however, and considerable interest
was renewed following several airplane crashes in the vicinity of air-
ports in the New York area, particularly at the Newark airport. These
accidents kindled the spark of investigation and General Doolittle was
appointed by President Truman to be Chairman of a Commission to
explore the problem of airports, taking into consideration safety, gen-
eral welfare and the National Defense.
On May 16, 1952, the Commission submitted its report, "The Air-
port and Its Neighbors." At the same time, there was prepared a legal
study of some of the problem involved which study was entitled. "The
Legal Framework of Airport Operations."1 The Doolittle Commission
reported 25 recommendations, number 9 of which reads as follows:
"Extend Civil Aeronautics Act to certificate airports. The Civil
Aeronautics Act should be amended to require certification of air-
ports necessary for interstate commerce and to specify the terms
and conditions under which airports so certified shall be operated.
Certificates should be revoked if minimum standards for safety are
not maintained. Closing or abandonment of an airport should be
ordered or allowed only if clearly in the public interest."
Thereafter, and in the Second Session of the 82d Congress, Senator
Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado introduced a bill S.3371 to carry out
the above recommendations, which bill was "To Promote Safety in
Air Transportation by Amending The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
in Order to Require Certain Airports to be Certificated Under the
Provisions of Such Act in Accordance with Recommendations of the
President's Airport Commission." While the Bill S-3371 was shelved,
it was not in conflict with later recommendations of the Airport Panel
on the National Airport Program.2
A companion bill to S. 3371 was an earlier introduced Bill S. 3129
of the same Congress which had as it purpose the removal of existing
obstructions and the prevention of future obstructions to Air Naviga-
I Pogue and Bell, 19 JOUR. or AIR LAw, C. 253 (Summer 1952).
2 The National Airport Program, 83d Congress, 2d Session, Sen. Doe. 95.
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tion. This Bill was intended to be enabling legislation for a Na-
tional Zoning Program, a counterpart to the Certificating (Licens-
ing) Program.
In 1953, Mr. D. M. Proctor, President of the National Municipal
Association, reported to President Eisenhower his concern over the
failure of Congress to advance vitally needed airport appropriations
and said,
"... while airports are a great public benefit to the cities they serve,
their major benefit is to the Nation. Airports are vital to the Nation
and to the progress of our Country.. . ." s
Policy of Present Administration
The Civil Air Policy of the present Administration is contained
in a document by that title issued in May 1954. In commenting upon
the Federal role in airports, no mention is made of Federal licensing
of airports. The omission of comment and the general tenor of the
statements indicates that Federal licensing has not been favored by the
present Administration.
On January 17, 1955, there was released by Senator John W. Bricker
an Aviation Study prepared for the Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce of the United States Senate in connection with its
hearing on S. 2647 of the 83rd Congress. This very important omnibus
aviation bill has many interesting points. In this instance, an effort
will be made to mention only such points contained therein as have a
bearing on the question of the Federal licensing of airports. The Study
indicates that the effect of the changes proposed in S. 2647 would be to
eliminate the present slight measure of uncertainty on the question of
safety regulations and provide specifically that total responsibility of
safety regulation of aviation lies with the Federal Government. It is
the contention of the authors that there is more need for clarification
of safety regulations at, near and in airports than elsewhere.
Section 601 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which im-
poses the duty on the CAB and the CAA to promote safety of flight in
air commerce, has been interpreted as including a mandate to prescribe
also safety regulations for persons and property on the ground.' S. 2647
proposes an amendment which would specifically so provide. The
Aviation Study appears, at one and the same time, to say this proposal
seemed unnecessary but that the importance of this matter may be
such that it would be useful to add a provision to make clear beyond
question that the aims of safety regulations include the protection of
persons on the ground.
Of particular significance are the proposals of S. 2647 to substitute
the term "air navigation" for the term "air commerce" and to substi-
tute the term "Federal Airway" for the term "civil airway. The term
3 Municipal L. R. 1954, page 62.
4Aviation Study, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Sen. Doe.
163, 83d Congress, page 76 (1955).
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"air navigation" is proposed to mean, among other things, the opera-
tion or navigation of aircraft in commerce or otherwise upon any
airport in the United States or in the airspace over the United States.
It is also significant to note that the proposal to use the term "air
navigation" as it is defined calls for an amendment to Section 2, the
Declaration of Policy of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 so that there
shall be considered, among other things, as being in the public interest.
"the regulation of air navigation as to best promote its development
and assure the highest degree of safety."
And it is also significant that the public right of transit as granted
by Section 3 of the said Act would be amended by the substitution of
the term "air navigation" for the term "air commerce" which broad-
ened term, it is to be remembered, includes airports. It appears that
the proposal to substitute the term "Federal Airway" for the term
"civil airway" would broaden Federal jurisdiction to include traffic
control areas which extend beyond the paths of present civil airways.
The foregoing is believed to be a fairly accurate but not all inclu-
sive summary of the question of Federal licensing of airports which
gained a short-lived activity following the report of the President's
Airport Commission in 1952, and which is presently coming to the
fore again.
While the authors hold no brief for the details and form of the
abovementioned Bills S. 3371 and S. 3129 of the 82d Congress and
S. 2647 of the 83d Congress, it is submitted that any such proposed
legislation is not actually an extension of Federal control, but that such
would be merely a continued exercise of an already clearly established
Federal power. Such legislation is not only proper but necessary. It
cannot be reasonably argued that the field of airport operation, in
terms of standards of safety, can be regarded as distinct and apart from
the regulation of actual operational flights or travel through navigable
airspace, over which Congress has clearly established exclusive Federal
jurisdiction, and may in the near future more clearly define.
Before offering to substantiate legally, the position the authors have
taken in this article, there are some other points of general public
interest which should be noted.
Importance of the Airport
Air travel has outgrown airports, planes and routes, and there exist
traffic jams in the sky. This phenomenal growth with its resulting
problems is obvious to the air traveler and studies are being made.5
Airports serve two well-known and understood functions. One is trans-
portation and the other is National Defense. While all forms of trans-
portation serve National Defense, aviation probably plays the most
important part of transportation in our National Defense.
The military has consistently stated that it cannot perform its func-
5 Special CAR-Reg. #SR 408 (Oct. 20, 1954).
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tion of defending our country from attack if it must rely solely upon
military airports and military aircraft and navigation facilities. No one
disagrees with this conclusion and it is therefore clear that in consid-
ering the airport problem we cannot separate into two separate com-
partmets the Military Airport Problem ad the Civil Airport Problem.
Further, it is axiomatic that our country must not only have adequate
airports but airports properly located.
Here is a good place to recall the Government's legislatively de-
clared policy on aviation, as set forth in Section 2 of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938.6
"In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under
this Act, the Authority shall consider the following, among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the
public convenience and necessity-
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transporta-
tion system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense;(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest
degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such
transportations, and to improve the relations between, and coordi-
nate transportation by, air carriers;
(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best
promote its development and safety; and
(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics."
The policy clause of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 must ever and
always be kept in mind.
It is of little use to have control over the flight of aircraft through
the air if one cannot get them down on the ground. As a matter of
fact, from the standpoint of safety, the airport and operations in the
area above and around the airport, create the greatest problem. Acci-
dent statistics show that by far the greatest number of accidents and
the greatest losses occur on and in the vicinity of airports. 7 There is
no dispute but that landing and take-offs are the two most critical
operations.
As some examples of what occurs when the Federal Government
does not fulfill its obligation in air commerce, we observe the fiasco in
Texas involving the fight between the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth
over air terminal facilities. In the Capital of our Nation, we find a
civilian, a Navy and two Air Force fields creating serious problems of
safety and reducing the quantity of commercial air transportation be-
cause of their proximity to each other and of the civil airport. The
problem is not diminishing, but is expanding because of the faster
speed of aircraft and the increasingly difficult problems created by
speed. This is not the place to outline in detail all of the factors in-
6Pub. Law 706, 75th Cong., Act of June 23, 1938; 49 USC 402.
7CAB Statistical Analysis of Non-Air-Carrier Accidents 1953, issued July 1,
1954.
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volved, but it is sufficient to state that these problems which all re-
volve around airports are some of, if not the most serious, now fac-
ing aviation.
A study of the history of the High Density Air Traffic Control Pro:
gram instituted by the CAB and the CAA for Washington National
Airport discloses how serious and far-reaching this problem is. A pub-
lic hearing which lasted two days was held by the CAA on February
15 and 16, 1955, concerning the proposal of the CAA to establish a
"High Density Air Traffic Zone" in the Washington, D. C., area. Testi-
mony was offered by all the main users of the airspace. At the time
this is written, the CAA has not issued its final determination of the
problem.
We must now recognize that the strength of our National militarily
and our ability to compete and hold our own in the family of Nations
economically is tied directly to the strength and progress of our avia-
tion. We are in a field where there can be no compromise with any
thing less than the best. We assume that as a Nation we have the in-
telligence and we know we have the resources to assure the highest
possible strength and efficiency and usefulness for both our Civil and
our Military aviation.
The orderly development of our irport program to insure the nec-
essary coordination between the Civil and Military phases requires
that our airport program be a unified one with a minimum of waste
and a maximum of availability and usefulness. Such results have never
been achieved except where a single Government agency has assumed
the responsibility. Even highway networks have been found wanting
from the National standpoint and Federal participation has been con-
sidered increasingly important. It seems to us that Federal licensing
of airports is an absolute necessity if we are to reach and maintain
our goal.
Meaning of "Navigable Airspace"
Returning to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the extent of
the control exercised by Congress in that Act, let us look at the phrase,
"Navigable Airspace." The lawmakers undoubtedly used the word
"navigable" with the word "airspace" because of the meaning that
word had been given with respect to navigable waters. With respect
to airspace, it is obvious that airspace that at one time would be con-
sidered non-navigable, now with the advent of the helicopter, con-
vertoplanes and the vertical take-off planes, is clearly navigable. In
other words, what was not navigable even yesterday is navigable today.
There was a lag in the Federalization of inland water transportation8
and it is hoped that such will not continue in air transportation, as
air as an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably Fed-
eralized by the Commerce clause than is navigable waters.
But casting aside all these refinements, it seems clear that all of
8 Knauth, Crime in the High Air, Vol. XXV, Tulane L. R. 446 (June 1951).
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the airspace necessary to land, take-off and adequately maneuver for
landing and take-off is in fact navigable airspace. It is not only navi-
gable, but it must be maintained navigable if we are to maintain any
semblance of a sound aviation industry. Even the wildest opponents
of Federal control do not claim you can operate an airport in non-
navigable airspace. Congress has exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
that and it must continue to do so if it is to fulfill its obligations.
As the authors have indicated, it is their position that in the in-
terests of National Defense, public welfare, safety and uniformity,
airports must be Federally licensed. While we have reached the point
of traffic jams in the sky, it is the airport which causes such traffic jams
because some of the most technical and skillful phases of flying take
place in the take-offs and landings from the airpotrs. It is to the air-
port and its runways and facilities that civil airways extend.
Federal airways do not stop at some unsettled number of feet above
or away from the airport. Logically and of necessity, they extend down
and into the airport. It has judicially been said by the Supreme Court
of the United States that the moment a ship taxies onto a runway it
is caught up in an elaborate and detailed systeri of controls which are
controlled solely by the Federal Government.9
It is high time that it be stated that it is equally, if not more im-
portant from the standpoint of safety, for the Federal Government to
supervise and regulate the landings and take-offs of airplanes than for
instance the flight of airplanes after they have leveled off on their
course high above the ground and far from the airport. There are
those who have not thought the matter through who believe that, by
licensing and certificating the airplane and for an all inclusive word.
its handlers, the Federal Government need go no further.
Those who have studied the problem without thouight of politics
or fear of criticism and with the sole objective of obtaining the best
possible facilities for air commerce have concluded that airports should
be Federally licensed. This was the conclusion of the President's Air-
port Commission mentioned above. The Airline Pilots Association
revealed at its Air Safety Forum in Chicago, in March 1954, that a
comprehensive airport analysis sheet is being compiled in support of
the Association's recommendation that airports be certificated. It may
well be that further delays in following such recommendations will
cause greater loss of lives and greater catastrophies. Delay will cer-
tainly increase the cost of aviation.
State-Federal Problem
The problem is complicated by some misconceptions and preju-
dices. There are those who would see great violation of States' rights.
Then there exists timidity on the part of Government officials to carry
out the law as it now stands. Lack of Federal appropriations permit
a status quo.
9 Northwest Airlines v. Minn., 322 US 292 (1944).
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The Congressional declaration of intent and interpretation of Fed-
eral authority over the airspace is contained in Section 6, paragraph
(a) of the Air Commerce Act of 1926. That section states:
"The United States of America is declared to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive National sovereignty in the airspace above
the United States, including the airspace above all inland waters and
the airspace above those portions of the adjacent marginal high seas,
bays, and lakes, over which by International law or treaty or conven-
tion the United States exercises National jurisdiction. .. "
In 1930 in the Second National Airport Conference held on May
14th of that year, it was pointed out by the Committee on Traffic
Handling that
"Federal control over all traffic movements would probably be the
simplest method of adoption and enforcement." 10
Another expression of Congressional authority is contained in
Section 3 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. That section reads:
"There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any
citizen of the United States, a public right of freedom of transit in
air commerce through the navigable airspace of the United States."
It is enlightening to note that the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1941
concluded that it must, in carrying out the provisions of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, exercise jurisdiction over all of the navigable
airspace. It further, at that time, determined that all of the airspace
in which an aircraft could be maneuvered was navigable.,, At that time,
the Board after a factual investigation and public hearing in Septem-
ber 1941 determined that all aircraft in the air constituted an "oper-
ation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may
endanger safety in, interstate, overseas ,or foreign air commerce," and
thus constituted "air commerce." This administrative determination
was sustained in US vs Drumm, et al.la When this interpretation is
applied to Sections 610 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, it imposes
the requirement that every aircraft that gets off the ground have an
airworthiness certificate and every person who pilots an aircraft or
serves in the capacity of an airman have a proper Federal airman cer-
tificate. The Rosenhan case was confined to a civil airway but it sup-
ports the above conclusion. 2
This interpretation has been uniformly applied since 1941, and so
far as we know has never been successfully challenged. As a matter of
fact, it has been, for the most part, accepted and considered as a proper
and beneficial construction of the law.
One of the authors participated in the complete revision of Part 60
of the CARs by the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1945. In drafting th
minimum altitude rules (Section 60.17) there was no intention ex-
10 Proceedings of the Second National Airport Conference of 1930, p. 65.
11 CAR, Regulations Serial #193, Amendment #135, effective Dec. 1, 1941.
"a U.S. v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151, 1 AVI 1177 (DC Nev. 1944).
12Rosenhan v. US., 131 F. 2d 932, 318 US 790; cert. denied (1943).
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pressed by any participant in the drafting that these rules were defini-
tions of the "navigable airspace" term used in the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938. All of the discussions were on the question of what mini-
mum altitudes should be specified to protect the persons on the ground
as well as those in the air. The rule was intentionally drafted to permit
aircraft to be flown at any altitude between zero and 500 feet when
such flight would not endanger the person or property of another. The
revision of the rules at that time was a departure from Government
paternalism and gave a pilot freedom to operate with risk to himself
so long as he was not endangering another. 2
A recent expression of the Civil Aeronautics Board concerning the
meaning of the term navigable airspace is contained in Interpretation
No. 1 of Part 60, adopted July 22, 1954.11 In that the Board construes
the words
"except when necessary for take-off or landing, no person shall
operate an aircraft below the following altitudes,"
which words are contained in Section 60.17 of the Civil Air Regula-
tions, as establishing a minimum altitude rule. In its interpretation
of that rule, the Board states:
"It is a rule based on the standard of necessity, and applies during
every instant that the airplane climbs after take-off and throughout
its approach to land. Since this provision does prescribe a series of
minimum altitudes, within the meaning of the Act, it follows,
through the application of Section 3, that an aircraft pursuing a
normal and necessary flight path in climb after take-off or in ap-
proaching to land is operating in a navigable airspace."
Interstate Commerce Clause
All of the above is an application of the Interstate Commerce Clause
of the Constitution. The full extent of the Federal Government's con-
trol over the airspace has not yet been determined by the Supreme
Court. Those cases which have reached it have given that Court an
opportunity to discusss the general issue as well as the specific issue
and the language of the Court is significant. For instance, in North-
west Airlines v Minnesota, supra, the Court stated:
"Air as an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably
Federalized by the Commerce Clause than is navigable water. Local
exactions and barriers to free transit in the air would neutralize its
indifference to space and its conquest of time. Congress has recog-
nized the National responsibility for regulating air commerce. Fed-
eral control is extensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about
in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by Federal permis-
sion, subject to Federal inspection, in the hands of Federally certified
personnel and under an intricate system of Federal commands. The
12a Article entitled The New Rules for Private Flying, by L. Welch Pogue, for-
mer Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, in Skylady magazine, Sept./Oct.
1945.
13 19 F. R. 4602. It is believed that CAB issued this interpretation because of
confusion resulting from the case of All. Am Airways v. Village of Cedarhurst,
201 F. 2d 273 (CA 2, 1953).
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moment a ship taxies onto a runway, it is caught up in an elaborate
and detailed system of controls. It takes off only by instruction from
the control tower; it travels on prescribed beams; it may be diverted
from its intended landing, and it obeys signals and orders. Its privi-
leges, rights and protection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes to
the Federal Government alone and not to any State Government."
(Emphasis supplied)
AUTHORITY TO LICENSE AIRPORTS
Now what may be the authority for licensing of airports under
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938? Section 606 of the Act authorizes the
Administrator
"to inspect, classify, and rate any air navigation (facility) available
for the use of Civil aircraft of the United States, as to its suitability
for such use. The Administrator is empowered to issue a certificate
for any such air navigation facility."
Section 1, paragraph (7) of the Act defines an air navigation facil-
ity as
"any facility used in, available for use in, or designed for use in,
aid of air navigation, including landing areas ... "
Paragraph (22) of that Section defines landing areas as
"any locality, either of land or water, including airports and inter-
mediate landing fields which is used, or intended to be used, for the
landing and take-off of aircraft, whether or not facilities are pro-
vided for the shelter, servicing, or repair of aircraft, or for receiving
or discharging passengers or cargo."
Going further, Section 302 (a) of the Act authorizes the Admin-
istrator
"(1) to acquire, establish, and improve air-navigation facilities
wherever necessary;
(2) to operate and maintain such air-navigation facilities."
This authority is useless without funds and it is probable that
emergency landing fields were contemplated by the authorities rather
than regular commercial airports. The language is clear, however, and
all possible ambiguity removed by Section 302 (c) which states the
Administrator is authorized
"to acquire by purchase, condemnation, lease, or otherwise, real prop-
erty or interests therein, including, in the case of air-navigation fa-
cilities (including airports) owned by the United States and operated
under the direction of the Administrator, easements through or other
interests in airspace immediately adjacent thereto and needed in
connection therewith."
Section 303 of the Act refers also to the acquisition and certifica-
tion of landing areas by the Administrator. Section 307 directs the
Administrator to make plans for the
"orderly development and location of landing areas.., as will best
meet the needs of, and serve the interest of safety in, Civil aviation."
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Whether a certificate as used in the Act is a license may involve
some legal refinements not pertinent to this discussion. We consider
that, under the Act, the use of an airport not certificated might be
prohibited in the same manner as the use of an uncertificated aircraft.
This is the purpose of licensing.
It seems clear enough that airports may be certificated under the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Under the literal interpretation of the
Act, the authority extends to all airports available for the use of Civil
aircraft in the United States. This, at first glance, seems sweeping, but
when one considers that all aircraft must conform to Federal Regula-
tions, there seems no basis for the distinction as to airports. So far as
civilian operations are concerned, neither the aircratf nor the airport
is of any use without the other.
Judicial Decisions Noted
Since the effort and thinking which went into the Air Commerce
Act of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, there have been
various judicial decisions which should be noted. Under the authority
of Euclid v Ambler14 the "airport area" was regulated through zoning
by the Municipality or the State. The Civil Aeronautics Administra
tion has required adequate zoning laws or other protective means
before any airport projects under the Federal Airport Act of 1946
are approved.1 5
And there appears to be adequate power in the Federal Govern-
inent to regulate the height of present and future structures about
airports through eminent domain and possibly zoning. In the case of
Jasper v Sawyer, it was stated by Judge Holtzoff:
"It is settled by decisions of the Supreme Court, beyond peradventure
of doubt, that the United States is clothed with the power of eminent
domain: Even though the power was not expressly conferred by the
Constitution, the power is implied and is incidental to carrying out
other powers, Kohl v US, 91 US 367, 23 L Ed 449. The right of emi-
nent domain which exists in the Federal Government may be exer-
cised by it within the States, so far as is necessary to the enjoyment
of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. Under its power
to regulate commerce between the States, as well as foreign com-
merce, it is fundamental that Congress may construct, maintain and
operate instrumentalities of such commerce."
"... It is clear that in the light of modern developments an airport is
an instrumentality of both foreign and interstate commerce....
".... The Court feels that it is beyond the realm of debate that an
airport is as much an instrumentality of commerce as a highway, a
bridge, a lock, a dam, a lighthouse, all of which have been constructed
at various times in different places under the authority of Acts of
Congress acting under the authority of Acts of Congress acting under
the commerce power." 16
14272 US 365 (1926).
15 Fed. Airport Act 49 USC 1101; Regulations of the Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics, Part 550, Sec. 550.11(b) (3), Part III, #7.
16Jasper v. Sawyer, 100 F. Supp. 423 (DC, DC 1951).
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Similarly, it might be argued that the Federal Government has the
power to zone, (although the question has never been judicially de-
termined). The constitutional basis for Federal zoning laws which
would limit the height of structures in airport approaches is the pro-
tection of air commerce, the flow of which, being subject to direct
regulation, must be aided also by indirect regulation where this is
necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the original laws. The Gov-
ernment's sole authority has been to protect the flow of commerce,
except as noted above with respect to the interpretation of Section
601 (a), the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.17
It must also be remembered that State Laws and Police Regulations
must yield when they come into conflict with the National power over
commerce.1 8
With respect to Interstate Commerce, postal service and matters
of National Defense, jurisdiction over passage through the air may be
said to have been expressly or implicitly surrendered by the States to
the United States by the adoption of the Federal Constitution. It has
been held that, insofar as these Regulations established by the Federal
Government promote safety and efficiency in interstate, overseas or
foreign commerce and bear some reasonable relationship to the sub-
ject matter, they are supreme and may not be denied.' 9
The power of Congress to legislate on that which affects Interstate
Commerce was clearly upheld and reaffirmed in the case of Rosenhan
v United States, supra, which showed that safety regulations apply to
all who enter an airway. The Court said that since the Defendant
admitted he was operating in an Interstate Airway, he was subject to
safety regulations even though there was no present danger from his
being there at the particular time. Congress sought to eliminate all
potential dangers, and therefore it assumed control over all flights
within an Interstate Airway. A later case went even further and stated
that any flight in United States airspace could be controlled by the
Civil Aeronautics Board Regulation." This case seemed to hinge upon
the application made of the Civil Aeronautics Act definition of "air
commerce." The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gave the Civil Aero-
nautics Board power to make regulations for flights that "may affect
or endanger" Interstate Commerce. Congress has the power to regu-
late Intrastate Commerce where it affects Interstate Commerce, and
its occupation of the field gives the Federal Government exclusive reg-
ulatory control over those phases upon which it has acted.21 Any State
Regulation which conflicted with Federal Regulation would be an
unconstitutional burden on Interstate Commerce, and even though
the State may have acted in the field first, it cannot exclude Federal
17 Footnote 4, Supra.
18 People v. Katz, 249 NYS 719 (1931).
19 Rosenhan v. U.S., Supra, Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 SE 2d 610
(1949).
20Drumm v. U.S., 55 F. Supp 151 (DC Nev. 1944).
21 International Shoe v. Pinkus, 278 US 261 (1928).
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occupation. As stated by Chief Justice Stone in United States v Wright-
wood Dairy Co.,22
"No form of State activities can constitutionally thwart the regu-
latory power granted by the Commerce Clause to Congress."
Thus, if the subject of the regulation is such as to require uni-
formity among the States as to air commerce, the power of Congress
must be deemed exclusive. The obvious need for regulation of Civil
aviation in all phases of its operation, including the establishment and
enforcement of minimum standards of safety in the maintenance and
operation of airports, clearly demands uniformity in such regulation.
Such uniformity can be achieved only at the National level.
Even if the subject were such as to admit of diversity of regulation,
it seems clear that a State may regulate only until Congress has occu-
pied the field. In this situation, Congress must clearly indicate its
intent to occupy the field, 3 and when clearly expressed, the State Reg-
ulation ceases.24 Not only may such repeated expressions of an intent
to occupy the field of regulation of safety in Air Commerce activities
be inferred from the past rulings and regulations of the Civil Aero-
autics Board, and from the broad scope of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, but a further expression of intent with respect to the regula-
tion of airport standards of safety was set forth in express terms in
S. 3371 and is now set forth in S. 2647.
It seems obvious that State Laws in this field of airport licensing,
would be a burden on Interstate Commerce, and whether or not they
are of such an unreasonable burden as to render them unconstitutional
is beside the point, once it is realized that the magnitude sought to be
governed is such that effective Safety Regulations can be achieved only
if uniformly applied and that such uniformity can emanate from Fed-
eral legislation alone.
The cases mentioned above dealing with navigable airspace put
no exact measurement on the same. The cases say that navigable air-
space is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government
all as the authors have endeavored to trace.
While the case of United States v Causby5 is generally quoted as
being consistent with the foregoing indicated trend, the authors believe
the case actually represents a stumbling block and reflects the timidity
of Federal officials and the resurgence of States right thinking at the
time of the decision. While the opinion does hold that the air is a
public highway as Congress has declared and that common sense re-
volts at the idea that ownership of lands extended up to the sky, the
majority opinion went on and held that navigable airspace was that
space above the minimum altitude set for cross-country flight as dis-
22 315 US 110 (1942).
23Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Norwood, 283 US 249 (1930).
24 Chicago R. I. & P. R.R. Co. v. Hardwick Farms Elevator Co., 226 US 426
(1913).
25 328 US 256 (1946).
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tinguished from the safe-glide angle set for take-off and landing. The
effect seems to say that below such minimum altitude the plane de-
scends to the airport under the jurisdiction of the subjacent state. What
many difficulties may result? At least a clarification seems essential in
view of this case. As we said earlier, we have to get the plane on the
ground and it is from the minimum altitude to the ground where the
pilot should have more certain and uniform regulations than elsewhere.
Mr. Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Mr.
Justice Burton, in the above mentioned Causby case, and most properly
deplored the majority opinion when he said,
"no greater confusion could be brought about in the coming age of
our air transportation than that which would result were Courts by
Constitutional interpretation to hamper Congress in its efforts to
keep the air free."
Our above comments about the Causby case also apply to some extent
to a recent case in Pennsylvania.2 6
It is accordingly the view of the authors that in the public interest
and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity, all as
detailed in the legislatively declared policy of the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, it is essential that the Federal Government take the neces-
sar ysteps to license airports. It is also the view of the authors, as ar-
gued above, that it is now beyond the realm of debate that an airport
is as much an instrumentality of commerce as any other concept which
has been constitutionally placed under the commerce power of the
Federal Government, and that all that is needed is appropriate Fed-
eral legislation to carry the same into effect.
26 Gardner v. County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania Supreme Ct., 4 Avi. 17528
(1955).

